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The Atmosphere as a Global Common:
From a Tragedy to a Drama
Economic Growth in Perspective
Maddison (2008) 2
Growth and Poverty Reduction
• People living in absolute 
poverty: >1 Billion
• Low economic growth could 
drastically reduce 
development in many 
countries
• Zero growth is not sufficient 
to reach environmental targets
 Banning growth does not 
seem to be a feasible solution 
to protect the environment
Dollar and Kray (2002)
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World Map of Wealth
Füssel (2007)
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World Map of Carbon Debt
Füssel (2007)
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6Carbon Debt and Wealth
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 K: Capital stock  (US$2000 per person)
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Fitting line: ln P=0.987 ln K+c
Füssel (2007)
The impact of economic growth on the environment
7
Climate Change: Tipping Points in the Earth System
“Tipping processes of the climate system” show a strong reaction 
already to small climate changes
Schellnhuber, 1996; Lenton et al., 2008 8
Cost-benefit Analysis or Risk Management?
• Weitzmann 2009, 2010: The Dismal Theorem
– Due to „fat-tailed“ climate sensitivity and uncertain tipping points there 
is a non-trivial probability of catastrophic damages
– For CRRA utility functions the expected utility converges to minus 
infinity 
Climate damages
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T. M. Lenton & H. J. Schellnhuber (Nature Reports Climate Change, 2007)
Prognosis 
for 2100 
(IPCC 2007)
Burning Embers Diagram
2°C above
pre-
industrial
level
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Climate Change Mitigation as Insurance
– In this case the cost-benefit calculus breaks down. With risk aversion, 
basically the entire income is used to avoid the possibility of 
catastrophic damages.  
– Climate policy as insurance against catastrophic climate change! 
Stern (2008) 11
Climate Policy as a Hotelling Problem
Cumulative emissions 2000-2050 (GtCO2)
Meinshausen et al (2009) 12
13Kalkuhl et al. 2009
Under BAU more than 
1200 GtC
are disposed into the 
atmosphere
Unlimited Resources – Limited Disposal Space
Stabilisation of Atmospheric CO2-Concentration  
3 stabilisation goals with different probabilities of attaining the 
2° goal: 550ppm-eq, 450ppm-eq, 400ppm-eq
550ppm-eq 450ppm-eq 400ppm-eqBaseline
Negative emissions
~75% prob.
~50% prob.
~15% prob.
CO2 –emissions (energy)
Knopf, Edenhofer et al. (2009)
Year
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Transformation of the Energy System
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emissions
REMIND-R, ADAM 450ppm-eq, 4/6/2009, Steckel/Knopf
Negative CO2
emissions
Based on IEA Data (1971-2005) and REMIND-R results for 450ppm-eq (ADAM); Graphic by Steckel/Knopf (PIK)
450ppm-eq.
Scenario
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… and What About Energy Efficiency?
Luderer et al. 2011
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The Atmosphere as a Global Common
17
Resource Extraction
> 12.000 GtC
Atmosphere: Limited Sink
~ 230 GtC
Managing the Atmosphere with a Sky Trust
1) Determine Magnitude of Atmospheric Disposal Space
 Balance Costs & Risks of Climate Change with Mitigation
2) Adopt efficient Policy Instruments: Carbon Tax or ETS 
3) Distribute the Climate Rent
18
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From Tragedy to Drama: Strategic Options
Benefits Costs
Domestic
Avoided domestic 
damages &
Co-Benefits
Domestic 
mitigation costs 
(energy, growth)
Global
Avoided damages in 
other regions
(ethics)
Costs for other 
regions (ethics);
Access to 
mitigation in other 
regions
Country Calculus for Mitigation Program
Demand for
Mitigation
Supply of 
Mitigation
20
Living in a Second-Best World: Technology Policies 
• Supporting Renewables: Fatal Aberration?
• Subsidizing CCS: Almost First Best?
• Combine both Options: A Bridge towards an 
International Agreement?
The current Global Energy System 
is Dominated by Fossil Fuels
Shares of energy sources in total global primary energy supply in 2008
IPCC SRREN 2011 21
The Technical Potential of Renewable Energy 
IPCC SRREN 2011 22
The Costs of Renewables are Often Still Higher Than 
Those of Non-Renewables. But…
IPCC SRREN 2011 23
...Some RE Technologies Are Already Competitive
Binary cycle plant
Domestic pellet heating system
Palm oil biodiesel
Small scale CHP (steam 
turbine)
IPCC SRREN 2011 24
Renewable Energies have a Potential to Lower Costs
IPCC SRREN 2011 25
Case 1: Carbon Pricing is Necessary and Sufficient
MC Black
Electricity
MC Green
Electricity
Green EnergyBlack Energy
PE1
MC Black
Electricity
MC Green
Electricity
 Social Costs
of Carbon
Green EnergyBlack Energy
PE2
PE1
Edenhofer et al. 2007
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Case 2: Additional Promotion of Renewables is not Reasonable
► Several stable equilibrium 
points (PE3 and PE1) are 
possible if the supply curves 
show a non-convex 
behavior
(PE2 is not stable).
►Without additional policy 
support, the system will 
steer
towards the neighboring 
equilibrium point PE3.
►PE3 > PE1: 
the system is efficient. 
Edenhofer et al. (2007)
27
28
Case 3: Additional Promotion of renewables is Reasonable
►The internalization of the 
social costs of energy 
supply (e.g. via a cap and 
trade system) improves the 
competitiveness of 
renewable energies
►As long as the cross-over 
point PE3 does not vanish, 
this, however, still results in 
an inefficient state.
Social Costs of Carbon
Edenhofer et al. (2007)
Robustness of Policy Instruments
29
Consumption losses relative to the 1st-best optimum of optimal and “close-to-be-
optimal” instruments that deviate by +1% and -1% from the optimal value.
Kalkuhl, Edenhofer, and Lessmann 2012
2nd Best-Technology Policy
Kalkuhl, Edenhofer & Lessmann 2011
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Carbon Capture and …
31
Combustion
Bio+CCS /
Air Capture
Atmospherical CO2
Geological 
C storage
C in Fossil
Resources
+CCS
…Storage (CCS)
Not fully sustainable 31
The peculiar role of CCS
• Subsidies for CCS create a scarcity rent and an implicit carbon 
price.
• No leakage and sufficient storage capacities might enable the 
policy maker to achieve a first-best solution.
• However, these assumptions are highly unrealistic.
32
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IMF (2011)
Renaissance of Coal?
Renaissance of Coal?
IPCC SRREN 2011
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Combining CCS and Renewables Policy
Welfare losses (in balanced-growth equivalents) of optimal second-best policies compared to 
the social optimum (   = 100%) under a carbon budget. The negative welfare losses of the 
laissez-faire (business-as-usual) economy indicate the mitigation costs due to the carbon 
budget constraint.
Kalkuhl, Edenhofer, and Lessmann (2012)
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Rent Distribution
Kalkuhl, Edenhofer, and Lessmann (2012)
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…Use (CCU)
Combustion
Atmospherical CO2
Geological 
C storage
C in Fossil
Resources
+CCS
Renewable 
electricity
Gaseous and liquid 
fuels, e.g.CH4
Transitional
Carbon Capture and …
37
Renewable 
electricity
Gaseous and liquid
fuels, e.g.CH4
Atmospherical CO2
Combustion
Bio+CCS /
Air Capture
…Cycling(CCC)
Sustainable
Carbon Capture and …
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Geological or Biological 
C storage, e.g. charcoal
Linking Climate Cooperation with Technology Policies
• Combine agreement on emission reductions with agreement on 
research on
– mitigation technology  
– general (labor) productivity 
• Full cooperation can be reached
Spillover Intensity
Coalition Size
Productivity
Mitigation
Technology
Lessmann and Edenhofer (2011)
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4.1
1.9
0.93.1 (EU‐27)
5.1 (EU‐27)
0.5
0.4
0.6
0.4
1.9
CO2-trade balances for different world regions 1990-2008
Peters, Minx, Weber and Edenhofer (2011) 
Blue: CO2-Importing
Red: CO2-Exporting
Justification for Trade Sanctions?
40
• Moderate tariffs deter free-riding, enable global cooperation and increase global 
welfare 
• Credible, because climate coalition would gain from it
• Become obsolete once global cooperation is established 
• Legitimacy essential: misusage, retaliation, WTO
Trade Sanctions Against Climate Non-Cooperators
Lessmann, Marschinski, and Edenhofer (2009)
Tariff on imports from free-rider countries in percent 
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Creation and ‚Linking‘ of Emissons Trading Systems
Canada 
0.74Gt
USA
6Gt
RGGI
0.17Gt
MGGA 0.83Gt
EU ETS
2Gt
Australia
0.45Gt
New Zealand
0.098Gt 
Japan 
1.4Gt
Switzerland
0.003Gt
WCI 1.1Gt
Brazil 
1 Gt
Mexico 
0.64Gt
Tokio 
0.012Gt
S‐Korea
0.6Gt
China 
6GtCalifornia 0.4Gt
Chile 
0.073 Gt
India 
1.5 Gt
Flachsland (2011)
 Reduction of mitigation costs by establishing 
access to low-cost abatement options 
 Potential for strategic incentives 42
Side Payments: Green Climate Fund
Fast start
finance (FSF)
Long-term
climate finance
2010 2020
10 bn
100 bn
US$
ramp up phase
years
Current standing: For 2010 
industrialized countries have 
earmarked US$ 12 billions 43
Brunner (2011)
IEA WEO (2011)
No Regret: Reducing Inefficient Fossil Energy Subsidies
44
Better REDD than dead?
Conclusions
• Climate Change is a Global Commons Problem: The 
atmospheric sink is being overused
• Key Question: Is it possible to transform the „Tragedy of 
the Commons“ into a „Drama of the Commons“?
• Appears difficult, but there are some promising 
technological and institutional options
• A world government will not be forthcoming in the next 
decades: Need to explore options for polycentric 
governance
www.mcc-berlin.net
Recommended Reading
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http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report http://www.klima-und-gerechtigkeit.de/
